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1.  INTRODUCTION 
A rapid  upward trend  in female labor  force  participation baa  been 
obaerved both in  the United States and  In other western Industrialized 
countries.  Analysis of  the determinants of female labor force 
participa  don—— labor  supply——has been  described as  a  maj or  'no ttago 
ndustry'  (see,  for  example,  Mincer,  1962;  Cain,  1966 and  1985;  deckman, 
1074  and  1978;  Layard,  Barton,  amd  Zabaiza,  1980;  Smith,  1980;  Smith  and 
Word,  1985).  Empirical estimates of  the  influence of  these  determinants 
is  important for  several reasons.  A practical reason for studying female 
Labor supply is  to evaluate the cost and  caseload Implications of respon- 
ses  of women to  changes in  the  terms  of access  to  and  the generosity of 
Lncome transfer programs, some  of which are  targeted on women.1  8 more 
basic reason is  the benefits that  derive from improved forecasts of  the 
future size  and  structure of  the  labor  force.2  The primary motivation of 
this study relates to  both of  thesa  reasons:  To what extent are  the work 
decisions of  the radically larger future cohorts of older woaen covered 
by Social Security Disability Imsursnce (5501)  and other transfer 
programs--attributable to  the increased female labor force  participation 
rates--likely to be influenced by  the gemerosity and accessibiity of 
benefi  ts? 
This study,  then,  focuses on a particular aspect of  the  female labor 
supply issue  in the U.S.:  To what extent do older women with work 
experience respond to market and  transfer income opportunities when 2 
deciding between work and nonwork options?  Because the bulk of public 
transfers available to older women are  targeted on workers with health 
problems or disabilities, this question concerns the effects of 
disability-related transfers  on labor  supply.  The iaaue baa  been exten- 
sively studied  in  the case of older  men, motivated by the observed secu- 
lar  decline in  their  labor  force participation rates  and  assertions that 
this reduction in work effort has been caused by the growth and genero- 
sity of disability transfers (Leonard, 1979;  Parsons, 1980 and  1984; 
S  lade,  1984;  Havenan and Wolfe, l984a and l984b).  Although  this effect 
is equally relevant for  both older  women and men,  there  has been no prior 
study of this  response for women, its  importance camouflaged by  the 
generally increasing trend  of women's work.  Among older women however, 
this  trend  is less pronounced. 
The  issue  of  the effect of  transfer income--especially disability 
transfers--on  women's work has also seemed less  urgent because, until 
recently, only a small percentage of women have worked sufficiently to 
accumulate the necessary quarters of coverage to be covered by Social 
Security Disability Insurance (5501)  benefits,  the  largest source of 
disability-related transfer income.3  In 1960 only 99,000 women aged less 
than 64 were SSDI beneficiaries on the  basis of  their  own earnings 
record.  By 1984,  however,  this had  grown to 849,000, an eightfold 
increase.  In 1960,  the average age  of  these  disabled workers was 56.7; 
in 1984 it was  53.2 (U.S.  Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical 
Supplement, 1986). 
As  the incidence of women's work continues to grow,  eligibility for 
SSDI will expand,  as will the potential for disability transfers to 
influence wometYs work decisions.  Hence, for  both appraising the  future 3 
of  older womens  work patterns and forecasting the future costs and case- 
loads of public disability transfer programs, it is important that the 
work-transfer  linkage  for  older  women also be analyzed.  The common 
finding that women's labor supply response to wage and other income 
changes is substantially larger than that for men suggests that future 
aggregate cost,  caseload, and welfare  impacts  of various social security 
policies will be increasingly dominated by women and  their  choices. 
In  this paper, we estimate the  responsiveness of older female labor 
supply to both the level of income available if not working--primarily 
disability-related public transfers--and  expected income if working. 
Because  the circumstances and the process of choice is  likely to differ 
between married and unmarried women, we present estimates for  both 
household heads and wives. 
In Section 2 we present our model of  the  labor  supply decision of 
older women.  The model suggests that expected income flows if working  or 
not working  are primary determinants of the work choice.  For female 
household heads  younger than 62 who are working, the primary source of 
income  is labor earnings.  The bulk of income available if not working 
comes from public income transfers,  primarily those  providing income 
support if disabled.4  The data are described and the  results presented 
in Section 3.  They are interpreted in Section 4.  Section 5 offers 
conclusione. 
2  •  A  I4ODKL OF  WOMX  STATUS  CHOICE 
Our model begins with  the standard  assumption of utility maximization 
in  which individuals  face a choice between working, with its  associated 
income flow,  and not working, with it. available income  flow.  The income 4 
associated with each option,  together with other sources of utility (such 
as  time  spent  in leisure  and  the stigma associated with public transfer 
recipiency), determines  well—being. 
Utility  in the  labor  market,  L,  is 
UL 
= 
UL(M + A ÷ N,  ,  (I) 
where N  Is  the income flow  in the  labor market or work option,  A is exo- 
genous asset income,  N  is  earned income of other family members and  ff  is 
the  hours  of market  work.  In analogous fashion, 
= 
UD(T + A ÷ N, 0)  (2) 
is  the utility in the nonwork option, 0,  where  T  is  the income flow and 
H  0.  The partial derivatives of both functions with respect to H are 
negative and with respect to N, T,  A,  and N are  positive. 
We approximate the utility functions by assuming that they  are  linear 
in their  arguments.  Hence, the utility-maximizing individual followa the 
decision function, 
1* = 
UL(M +  A + N, H) - 
U0(T  +  A +  N,  0)  (3) 
cz(M +  A +  N) - L(T +  A + N) +  wX +  V, 
where X  is  a vector of parameters of  the utility function and V is a 
random error term  with a zero mean measuring tastes and  other unobserved 
variables.  Given this  rule,  and assuming  Ti is fixed for  those  choosing 
the  labor  market option, 5 
C 
1  if 1* >  0 
1= 
0 if  1*  0, 
where  I  represents the labor  market or work option and  0 represents the 
nonwork or  transfer recipiency option. 
Equation  (3)  could he directly estimated if all  of  the  right-hand 
side variables were observed.  The  expected coefficient signs are  posi- 
tive  for H and negative for T,  if  leisure  is  a normal good.  However,  the 
Lncome flows  (H, T) are observed only if  the  respective choice was made. 
(ence, we need  to  explicitly or implicitly determine H for  those  with I 
and  T  for  those  with I  I.  Equations (4) and (5)  describe the 
determination of H  and T as a function of variables Z,  including both 
exogenous individual characteristics expected to influence income flows 
in the work and nonwork options  and  the characteristics of  labor  and 
transfer markets describing the  terms  on which the  respective flows are 
vaiiable.  In  this  theoretical  representation we simplify, letting H 
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Since  ie aasumed  to be exogenous, E(€jj  )  0  for i  1,2. 
From this,  we can write the model as a simultaneous equation system 
in (6),  (7),  and (8): 6 
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The  selection  rule  presumes  that  individuals  know the outcome if 
either the work or  the  transfer recipiency  option is chosen,  implying 
that search activity in both options has  been engaged in,  and that  a 
lang-run equilibrium has  been achieved.  The seiection equation, however, 
recognizes that for  some individuais search tiny  be incomplete, so  that 
the  realized income flow in an option may  fall short of  or exceed the ax 
ante estimate of expected income.  The equation also refiecta  the cost of 
application and  the discretionary role of employers and  administrators to 
the extent they  depend on observed characteristics, . 
Since  and 
T1 
are  involved in the  decision process but our obser- 
vation of  them depends on  the final choice,  the  observed values are  trun- 
cated and OLS  estimates of (6)  and  (7) will be biased.  However,  given 
sample separation,  we observe the final choice.  Hence, l' 82 0112 
and 
0222 
are  identified  and can be consistently estimated by maximum likeli- 
hood techniques  or a two-stage method involving modified least squares 
and probit maximum likelihood. 7 
This,  then,  is an example of a "switching regression," where the 
switch  is  endogenous.  Our model has  been  discussed by Lee (1979),  who 
has shown that  the  system  can  be  estimated  by  the  following maximum like- 
lihood procedures.  The  relevant likelihood  function  is: 
= 
H(f1f1(M1 
- 1!lj' c3)ds31)'i 
(f2(T 
-  c3j)dE3)1i  (9) 
where 
f1  and f2 are  joint normal density functions for Ely E3j 
and E2j 
respectively.  However,  to  ensure  identification,  some  of  the 
variables  in 
.2j' 
are  excluded from the decision function.  Thus, 
(4)  and  (5)  become,  respectively: 
N1 
= _lO Eij 
+ 
_ii 2i +  (10) 
T. =  + +  Ci.,  (11) 
where W1 and W2 consist of decision variables, while Di and  are 
variables whose sole use  is  in income determination. 
With  this modification, the  likelihood function becomes 
£ -  - -lO lj  - 4l lj' £3)dC3j)'i 
x 
(ff2(T 
-  -  ,  33'-'j•  (12) 
All  coefficients, including the error  covariance matrix, are  esti- 
mated by  iterative  maximization of  the  log of  the  likelihood defined by 8 
(12).  Asymptotic standard errors of  these  estimates are obtained from 
the  inverse of  the Hessian of  this  log—likelihood  with respect to the 
coefficients.5  This procedure provides consistent and asymptotic effi- 
cient estimates, with the sole restriction that  the possibly non-zero 
covariance of  and £2 cannot be estimated. 
Starting values for the full maximum likelihood (ML)  estimation of 
equation (12)  are  from the  two—stage procedure defined by Lee  (1979), 
which utilizes modified least squares  in  the first stage  and probit  maxi- 
oom likelihood  in  the  second.  This probit-OLS model has gained  popu-- 
larity for  its  computational ease.  it  is,  however, less  efficient, and 
nay  underestimate the standard errors of  the estimates of  the coef- 
ficients a and I  in the  decision function (8). 
This approach to  modeling the work-nonwork choice is  the result of 
simplifications—-such  as  the use  of one  global  nonwork income  variable 
and a linear  utility function——which preclude specification of the 
complete and nonlinear budget constraint and  the  estimation of utility 
maximizing  work-nonwork choices with respect to it  (Hauaman,  1981). 
These simplifications  are dictated by the  complexity of market-transfer— 
family income-generation systems.  For example, in  the United States 
there is no single transfer program providing support to older nonworking 
or working women,  instead, several interdependent programs, each with 
its an  budget set and  eligibility criteria, provide cash and in-kind 
support to working—age people.  Some of  these  programs are  income con- 
ditioned (e.g.,  SSI);  others are not.  Some of these limit earnings 
(e.g.,  SSDI and SSI);  others do not (e.g., Workers' Compensation).  For 
some programs, eligibility depends on past work history  (e.g.,  55TH); for 9 
others,  eligibility depends on  the nature of an impairment and its  cause 
(e.g., Workers' Compensation and  Black Lung Compensation); for  stilt 
others,  the presence of  the  impairment  is sufficient to confer benefits. 
The cost of applying for benefits is very high in some programs (e.g., 
SSDI); application cost for others is effectively zero.  Any person can 
receive benefits from a number of  the programs simultaneously, depending 
on widely disparate coverage and  eligibility provisions.  Indeed, bene- 
fits awarded in one  program often automaticalLy grant eligibility for 
)enefits in another.  Moreover, the  system to  lit-defined, so  that Lnfor— 
na  don regarding  the availability of  benefits  from  the  several  inter- 
dependent  programs,  and  the  conditions  under which benefits can  be 
received,  is  poor.  Similar  complexities  affect the  Labor market  and 
interspousal  income flow options. 
In addition to  the complex and interdependent  nature of  the process 
by which income is determined in  the L and  0 options, the processes by 
which  individuals  apply and are found eligible for  income flows in each 
of  the options is not well understood.  In particular, the  process by 
which individuals move from disability transfer recipiency status to the 
labor market  is  a complex one,  though  such return to work choices are  in 
evidence in the U.S.  These processes involve  decisions by both those  who 
ultimately determine eligibility for  income flows  in these options-- 
employers, transfer program administrators and  husbands, each with  their 
own objectives and decision rules--and  women with their  own unique 
characteristics and  objectives.7  Our reduced-form model attempts  to 
accommodate all of  this  complexity. 10 
3.  DATA AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
The ML model which we estimate employs static,  cross-sectional data 
of  the sort used in a wide variety of recent studies of  the behavioral 
responses to incentives implicit in  tax and  tranfer programs (Danziger, 
Haveman, and Plotnick, 1981).  The data  are for women aged 45-62 in 1978 
who have worked full  time  for  7  years or more,  indicating a strong labor 
market attachment.8  This work history provides then with coverage by  the 
Social Security system.  The observations are from the Michigan Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics.  The choice of work status in a given year 
(1978) is  taken  as dependent on the value of  the expected income flow  in 
each option in that year,9 as weLl as  taste,  health, and stigma factors, 
implying that the  choice of  income  or  transfers  is reversible. 
Being a labor market participant (i.e.,  as having chosen option L)  is 
defined as having income fLows  or Labor  market characteristics defined  by 
at least one  of (1)  labor income  (earnings plus hours  unemployed or on 
strike times  average hourly earnings) greater than zero and no 
disability—related transfers,  (2)  being self-employed and reporting 500 
or more hours worked last  year,  or (3)  having disability-related trans- 
fers greater than zero but labor  income greater than $3,360.10  Its 
complement, option D,  is defined as not meeting the  criteria for having 
chosen the L option.  The  panel  character of  the data allows the  use  of 
time-related information before  and beyond 1978  to reflect both prior 
work history and expectations of future outcomes (e.g., variables related 
to expected future income flows in the L and D options.  See Willis and 
Rosen, 1979).  (The specific variables employed are described in Appendix 
A.) 11 
The variables included in (12)  reflect those  demand-side and supply- 
side characteristics of both the  labor  market and  the transfer  recipiency 
market' which are  likely to affect the presence of an individual in 
either group.  Education, family background, and  disability status cap- 
ture the  individual's perception of potential work capacity and  produc- 
tivity,  as  does age.  They also describe Important determinants of 
oligibility for  transfers.  The presence of children reflects the income 
requirements  of  the household  as well as  influencing the  opportunity cost 
f  working.  The area-specific unemployment rate,  region,  and  urban-rural 
background reflect the employment opportunities open to the  individual, 
and hence  the  likelihood  of both obtaining a job  or gaining eligibility 
for  transfers. 
The  location variables also proxy the differential application of  the 
criteria for determining the eligibility for  transfer  benefits.  Previous 
usual occupation and  the cause of  single status (for household heads) 
proxies transfer program coverage, past earnings and the  probability of 
receiving child support or alimony income.  The race  variable captures 
the effect of potential labor  market discrimination in both employment 
opportunities and  the determination of eligibility for  transfers. 
Religion is entered as a  taste  variable.  In the estimate for  wives, the 
effect of joint household considerations on the woman's work choice  is 
captured by  the age difference between the wife and  her husband, the 
asset income  of the  family,  and by the earnings  capacity of  the husband 
(as  opposed  to his actual earnings, which  tend  to be endogenous to  the 
wife's labor  market decision). 12 
Because  choice of  the nonwork option,  D, depends on  expected public 
transfer income if not working, and because disability-related transfers 
weigh so heavily in this  expected value,  it is essential that a disabil- 
ity  or health status variable which La  exogenous to  the work decision be 
included in the  set of independent  variables.  We use a multidimensional 
"true" disability measure obtained as an unobservable in a separate 
Latent variable structural model (LISREL) estimatIon (Joreskog and 
Sorbom, 1983).  This measure was  developed in Haveman and Wolfe (1985), 
and La briefly described in Appendix B. 
4.  EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Tables 1-3  present the empirical results from the maximum likelihood 
estimation.  The determinants  of labor  market  income  (N)  and  nonwork 
income  (T)  are shown in Tables 1 and 2  for  heads  and  wives, respectively. 
Table  3  contains the structural probability portion of  the model and 
shows the determinants of  the work (N)  or no work (D)  choice. 
The determinants of market income for household heads  are as pre- 
dicted by standard human-capital—based theory.  Age, work experience, and 
health status are all positively related to N and all are significant. 
The education and education-squared variables indicate that market Income 
falls with education up  to year 7, but rises thereafter.  Being white and 
growing up outside the  South both contribute positively to N,  hut only 
race is  significant  at  the .05  level. 
The underlying process of nomwork income determinatiom for  household 
heads is murkier.  While the  signs  on the  coefficients are all reasonable 
and consistent with expectations, only race is sigmificamt.  Being white 13 
tends  to be associated with greater transfer income because public Social 
Security benefits are  a positive function of earnings while working. 
The  labor market income  determinants for wives have much the same 
pattern as  for heads, although in  this  case growing up outside  the South 
is both positive and  significant.  The nonwork  income  determinants for 
wives again parallel those  for heads.  The additional variable in  the 
estimation for wives-—  the age difference between  the wife and her 
husband—-  is  positive  and  significant.  Having  a  disabled  husband  adds 
positively  to  the wife's  labor  income,  and  significantly  so  to  nonwork 
income.  The former  suggests  that  a woman  nay  work  more  if  she  Is  the 
primary  earner;  the  Latter that  this  increased  work leads  to  higher 
pension income.  This  nonwork  income  is  likely  to  be  further  increased  by 
lependents'  benefits for  a disabled spouse. 
The estimates In Table 3 allow us  to measure the work response of 
older women to  the  income  incentives  in  both the  labor  market  and  in  the 
oarket for  income  transfers.  These  estimates  also  indicate  the  role  of 
other factors,  including  alternative  time  demands  and  stigma con- 
siderations on  the choice of whether or not to work. 
For both heads and wives, expected income if working positively 
affects  the decision to work outside of the home;  it is statistically 
significant for wives.  While income expectations if not working appear 
to deter a decision to work outside the home for both female heads and 
wives,  the coefficient  is not significant in either case.  Older females, 
then,  appear somewhat responsive to  income incentives in both the  labor 
market and  the "transfer" market in  making their  labor  force par- 
ticipation  choice;  however, in 3 of  the 4 cases, these  concurrent market 
incentives are not  significant)1 14 
The response to income incentives is also captured by  the  expected 
growth or change in income variables1-2  as well as  the income level 
variables.  The change is  included to reflect the  long-term consequences 
of  the work-nonwork choice at any  point in time.  Choices made will 
generally include  an expectation of  future income in each option.  These 
expectations are  based  on actual experiences  to  1981  (a  three—year 
period).  Again, the responses of both female heads and wives ara  as 
expected, but are not  statistically significant for  either group. 
A likelihood ratio  test for  the joint significance of the  expected 
labor market income variables (N and change in N) was  run for  both heads 
and wives, and  indicates that the combination  is  statistically signifi- 
cant (at  the  1  percent level) for wives, but not for heads.  Similar 
tests for  the expected nonwork income  variables (T and  change in T)  and 
for  the joint significance of the change in market and  transfer incomes 
were not  significant (at  the  5  percent level)  for either group except the 
joint change of both incomes for wives.  Finally, a likelihood ratio teat 
for  the joint significance of all of  the expected income  variables (both 
levels and changes) was performed.  For wives, this  teat was significant 
at  the 1 percent level,  justifying the conclusion that the choice of 
whether or not to work is significantly affected by income expectations 
for  this  group.  It was not significant for heads, suggesting that  their 
work choice is not significantly affected by income expectations. 
Other coefficients in Table 3 are also of interest.  For both female 
heads and wives, health status is an important determinant of  the deci- 
sion of whether or not to work;  those  women with health problems are  less 15 
likely  to  be  labor  force  participants  than healthier  women.  This effect 
is in addition to  the impact  of  the  health variables  on  the work choice, 
which operates  through  the expected income  and  income-change  terms.  The 
number of  children borne  by  a  woman  before  age  25  years  is  a  significant 
determinant of  the  labor  supply  decision in later years,  but  has  a quite 
different impact for heads and wives.  For female heads,  births early in 
life tend  to discourage labor supply in later years; female headship 
proxies for widow, and suggests an income effect from the availability of 
survivors' and dependent benefits from Social Security.  For wives, 
having children early in life tends  to encourage work in later  years; for 
such women, child-rearing responsibilities  have been significantly 
reduced by age 40.  In the estimate for wives, the  husband's permanent 
wage rate13  and asset income  are designed to control for the effect of 
nonwork income on the  labor supply choice;  both are correctly signed and 
significant. 
Table 4 presents  the response elasticities of expected M and expected 
T for both heads and wives,'4 and the predicted probability of working. 
At  the mean of  the variables in the model, the elasticity of response to 
labor market income (N)  is very close to unity for  both heads  and wives. 
As with the models' coefficients, the elasticity of response to expected 
transfer income (T)  is smaller for both heads and wives:  -.73 and -  .24, 
respectively.15  At  the mean, the predicted probability of working is 
nearly .6 for heads, and nearly .5 for spouses.  The remainder of  the 
table  presents calculated response elasticities and predicted work proba- 
bilities at other points in the distribution.  The patterns are not unex- 
pected.  The better (worse) the health or disability status of older 
women, the higher (lower)  is their predicted probability of working and 16 
the  lower (higher) ie their response to income incentives, whether 
offered in the  labor or "transfer" markets. 
The final comparison shows the responaiveness of women of varying 
earning capacities.  Those with skills and,  hence, earnings expectations 
one standard deviation below the mean are only about one-half as  likely 
to be labor  market participants as those lying  one standard deviation 
above the mean earnings capacity.  More significantly, those  with poorer 
labor market prospects (and hence superior income transfer opportunities) 
are about twice  as sensitive to income incentives as are those well up in 
the potential earnings distribution.  Changes in income opportunities-- 
either from  working or through transfers--appear  to elicit a substan- 
tially greater response from low-skilled  women than from those  with 
skills and high earnings potential.  The low  labor force  participation 
probabilities for less—skilled women (.4 for heads and .31  for wives) 
appear to be rational responses to the income opportunities available to 
them in both the  labor  market and the "transfer" market. 
A test of the accuracy of our estimates is possible by comparing the 
predicted results  to the actual participation—nonparticipation decision 
of  the older  workers  in the sample.  Of  the 196  heads and 264  wives in 
the  sample  who are participants, 75 percent and 72 percent, respectively, 
are predicted by the estimated model to have a probability of more than 
.5 of being participants.  Of  the 148  heads and 278  spouses who are non- 
participants, 64 percent and 71 percent, respectively, have a predicted 
probability of more than .5 of beimg  nonparticipants.  Thus, our predic- 
tions are "correct" for 71 percent of the  sample.  The accuracy of  these 
predictions suggests that our model does identify  the significant 17 
determinants  of  the labor force participation decision of older women, 
including expected incomes in the  labor and  "transfer" markets. 
To obtain  a  rough estimate of  the  potential effects  of  changed  expec- 
tations regarding  both current  transfer  incomes  and  changed expectations 
regarding future  transfer  income  prospects,  we  simulate  the  effect  of  a 
0  percent  increase  and  a  20  percent  decrease in both  T  and  change  in  T 
for  each  observation  in  the  sample.  The  results, which are  based  on our 
nonlinear  NIL  estimates  shown in Table 5,  suggest that a 40 percent 
- 
increase in total  non—work  income flows  could  account for a  five- 
percentage-point decrease in older wives'  labor force participation, and 
i  13  point decrease in older heads.'  participation.  Since Social Security 
disability benefits account for  approximately 40  percent of this  income 
flow,  this  is  equivalent to raising these  benefits by 100  percent, or 2 
1/3  times  the 43 percent increase that actually occurred over the 
1968-1978 period.  Recall however that the head's simulation is based  on 
a  statistically insignificant coefficient and  so should be  treated  with 
caution. 
- 
5.  CONCLUSION 
These estimates of response suggest that  income opportunities, 
whether in  the labor market or  the  'transfer"  market, have an effect on 
the work  choices of older women, whether household heads or wives.  The 
rapid increase in female labor force  participation during the 1970s, 
which accompanied increased relative female wage rates and an improved 
outlook for women's work opportunities, are  consistent with  these 
results (Killingsworth, 1983). 18 
These results are also important for anticipating potential problems 
associated with changes in income transfer policy.  For older women at 
present, a primary source of income in the "transfer" market is 5501,  yet 
a relatively small percentage of these  women have worked for a sufficient 
number of quarters to qualify for recipiency.  Given recent trends in 
women's work patterns, a  far greater proportion of older women in the 
lS9Os  will be eligible for benefits.  Our results suggest that eligible 
women--especially low earners, wives, and those with health problems--dc 
respond to changes in the generosity and availability of transfer income. 
Sizable increases in expected benefits,  deriving from increases in either 
generosity or leniency, may well have substantial impacts on older 
women's work petterns. 
Nevertheless, many questions remain unanswered.  Little insight is 
gained into the relative contribution of other variables to the observed 
increase in female labor force participation rates.  While our  results 
suggest that  improvements in labor market incomes and opportunities in 
the 1970s have contributed to  the increase, the effect of changes in 
tastes for work,  social expectations regarding work, the  physical demands 
of occupations, the incidence of impairments, and income from husbands 
and other sources remains unexplained. 19 
Notea 
-A  number of studies have focused on  this  issue (Garfinkel  and Orr, 
1974;  Levy 1979;  Barr and Hall,  1981;  Hausman, 1981;  Burtless  and 
Moffitt, 1984). 
21n addition to  these  reasons, however, the extensive study of female 
labor  supply has  been driven by the knotty conceptual and econometric 
problems which dominate this  topic.  They include the interdependence of 
the husband's and  the wife's labor  supply decisions in two-adult  house- 
holds, and  the need to account for the process by which some women select 
Labor  market participation while others,  with apparently similar charac- 
teristics,  do not.  indeed,  the female labor  supply issue  has motivated 
important developments in both consumption (joint utility maximization in 
household choice)  and econometric (techniques for dealin4 with selection 
bias)  theory. 
woman requires one  quarter of coverage for each year after 1950  up 
to  the year the woman attains age 62.  Thus, a woman reaching 62 in 1979 
would need 28 quarters of coverage, acquired anytime after 1936. 
41n the  Michigan Panel Study of Income  Dynamics 1978 wave, 91 percent 
of nonworking female heads received public transfer income;  60 percent 
received SSDI or Supplementary Security Income (SSI)  Disabled benefits. 
5The derivatives of the  log-likelihood  with respect to the coef- 
ficients are in the Appendix of Lee (1979),  which contains a few errors. 
The correct derivatives are available from the authors on request. 
6This is  related to the assumption that each individual takes  the 





from individuals with similar characteristics in these options. 20 
71f these  objectives and rules  have changed over time,  the analysis 
at a point in  time would reflect both past and  current conditions.  This 
is unlikely to be significant in  this case,  as leniency had increased for 
most disability programs from their  inception to 1973.  Since one can 
reapply if denied,  the 1973  data are likely to  reflect 1978 rules and 
o  b  j  e  c  t  iv e  s. 
8We exclude workers  older  than  62  because most are eligible for 
Social Security early retirement benefits at 62.  Inclusion of oLder 
workers would further complicate the estimation problem and mask the role 
of disability transfers in the early retirement deciaions.  Evidence 
suggests that  the availability of disability transfers is  Less  likely to 
alter the work status of individuals below  45 years of age.  Extensive 
research on the  effect of disability transfers on men' s labor supply 
choices also focuses on this age group. 
9The data set for  the ML procedures--a BMDP-routine (P3RFUt4) with a 
3elf—supplied supplement-—contains twice  the  same  vector of  (work or 
nonwork) income observations.  However, for wives some of  the obser- 
vations of nonwork income are  missing owing to  the occasional failure of 
the data to  record the  existence and magnitude of interspousal  transfers. 
We used an "adjusted tobit"-model to  fill these  gaps  with  the expected 
values of nonwork income.  This entailed running a selectivity-corrected 
OLS  on the positive nonwork income observations, while  the Heckman selec- 
tivity term was calculated from a probit explaining the  presence and 





> 0)  E(T/T 
> 0). 
For details, see Nelson (1977),  Ffeckman (1979)  and Maddala  (1983,  pp. 
158—60). 
10Rectpients of SSDI  benefits are  allowed $28  of earned income  per 
month without calling into question their  eligibility status.  Earnings 
beyond this  amount is considered "substantial gainful employment" and  is 
viewed as  inconsistent with being "totally and permanently disabled." 
11The correlations between expected nonwork income (T) and expected 
labor  income (N)  are  .69  (wives)  and .86  (heads).  The large  value for 
heads may  account for the  large-but—insignificant  income coefficients for 
heads. 
12The  two expected change-in-income variables (Change in  NI;  Change in 
T) are calculated for each observation from expected income variables in 
1978  and 1q81:  Change in M = 
(M1981 
— 
M1978)/M1978; Change in T 
(T1981 
- 
T1978)/T1978.  For each of  the  two years, H and T are predicted 
From income  regressions fit  over observations in the  labor market  (L)  and 
"transfer" market  (0)  categories.  The right-hand  variab les  in  the  income 
regressions include  age,  education, occupation, race,  region, marital 
status, disability status, and a Heckman selectivity correction calcu- 
lated from a probit regression explaining the presence of observations in 
the L and D categories.  For spouses, a stepwise tobit regression was fit 
in order to predict T1981 and T1978, as a substantial number of  spouses 
in  the D category reported zero income (see note 9). 
13The husband'  s hourly wage rate is a predicted value based on a  log 
wage rate regression run on husbands with a reported wage rate.  The 
explanatory variables are  age,  education,  work experience, race,  region, 22 
religion, and a Heckman selection variable constructed from a probit 
regression fit  over all  husbands explaining the presence of a wage rate. 
14lnsofar as  the underlying income  and expected income coefficients 
are  not significant, these  elasticities are only suggestive cf the  rela- 
tive differences in the response to income incentives. 
1  5The  se  elas tici ties  are substantially  grea  ter  than  those  ea dma ted 
for older  men  in a related study  (Haveman  and Wolfe, l984b).  There, 
men's work choice was  modeled as a function of expected labor income, 
expected disability transfer income,  and  a variety of  taste  and stigma 
variables in a  two-stage  probit framework.  The work decision of older 
nen was significantly related to  expected income, but  the elasticities 
there  ranged from .006 to  .0003.  Here  the elasticities are  larger for 
both groups of women but are not significant for household heads.  While 
the direction of  the difference in response elasticities and significance 
Is consistent  with findings generally, the  substantial magnitude of  the 
difference suggests a greater labor  force  attachment of males and female 
heads relative  to  female  spouses  than  may  be generally recognized 
(Killingsworth, 1983). 23 
Table 1 
Determinants of Labor Market  Income, M,  and Nonwork Income, 
T, from Maximum Likelihood Model  for Female Household heads 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Labor Market  income  Nonwork Income 
Coefficient  (1—S tatis tic)  Coefficient  (i—Statistic) 
Age Dummy (>  60 = 1)  2.490  (2.21)*  .572  (0.70) 
Education  —.727  (1.20)  —.351  (0.68) 
Education Squared  .050  (2.04)*  .023  (0.91) 






















Race (White = 1)  2.077  (2.38)*  1.285  (2.36)* 
Region  (South  1)  -.304  (0.46)  -.423  (0.58) 
Marital Status 
Widowed 









Disability  Indicator  —.606  (2.87)*  - .260  (1.81) 
Constant  —1.245  .612 
*Significant at  .05  level 24 
Table 2 
Determinants  of Labor Market  Income, M, and Nonwork Income, T, 
from Maximum Likelihood Model for Wives 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Labor Market Income  Non-Work Income 
Coefficient  (t—Statistic)  Coefficient  ( t-S tatis tic) 
Age  Dummy  (>  60  = 1)  2.047  (0.91)  .736  (1.13) 
Education  —1.825  (2.45)*  —.013  (0.03) 
Education  Squared  .102  (3.40)*  .011  (0.05) 



























Race (White = 1)  1.225  (L.23)  1.070  (1.31) 
Region  (South =  1)  —1.756  (2.21)*  .121  (0.22) 
Disabled Spouse  1.795  (1.66)  2.140  (3.22)* 
Husband-Wife Age 
Difference  .131  (1.82)  .106  (2.41)* 
Disability  Indicator  —.812  (3.87)*  .047  (0.38) 
Conatant  —.759  -  .635 
*Significant  at .05  level 25 
Table  3 
Determinants of Work Choice (Ll), Maximum Likelihood 
Results from Structural Probability  Portion of Model, 
for Female Household Heads and Wives 
Explanatory 
Variab  Lea 
Reads  Wives 
Coefficient  (t—S  tatis  tic)  Coefficient  (t—S tatis tic) 
Expected Nonwork 
Income  (T)  —.302  (1.25) 
— .103  (0.71) 
Expected Labor Market 
income  (M)  .159  (1.07)  .136  (2.34)* 
Change  in T  —.326  (0.50) 
- .184  (1.20) 
Change  in N  .660  (0.54)  .421  (1.35) 
Work  Experience  .012  (0.85)  .026  (2.00)* 
Unemployment Rate  -.180  (1.69)  .108  (1.48) 
Age Dummy  (  60  1)  .222  (0.50) 
— .235  (0.52) 
Disability  Indicator  —.232  (2.23)* 
— .114  (1.90) 
Number  of Children--1-12  -.192  (1.90)  -.058  (0.81) 
Number  of Children before 
Age 25  —.130  (2.26)*  .146  (2.86)* 
Mothers  Education  —.021  (0.69)  -.036  (1.71) 
Religion Dummies 
Protestant  —.498  (1.50)  .038  (0.17) 
Catholic  —.229  (0.59)  .254  (0.95) 
Jewish  —.220  (0.30)  .850  (2.27)* 
Origin  Dummies 
Farm  .298  (1.47) 
— .117  (0.72) 
Urban  .052  (0.24)  .457  (2.74)" 
Wage  Rate of Spouse  —  —  -  .112  (2.04)* 
Asset  Income  —  -  -.147  (2.88)* 
Disabled Spouse  —  —  .271  (0.68) 
Race (White — 1)  .206  (0.49)  -  .214  (0.78) 
Constant  .553  .031 
-2 Log Likelihood Ratios 252.16*  33144* 
Number  of Observations  344  542 
*Significant at .05  level 
5This  test refers  to  the complete  ML-result, which  is  the combination  of Table  1 
and this  table  (first column) for heads, and Table 2  and the second column  of 
this table  for wives. 26 
Table 4 
Response  Elasticities  of M  and T  and 
Predicted Probabilities of Working [P(Work)], 
Calculated at Means and  Selected  Other Points  in 
the Distribution for Household  Heads  and Wives 
Heads  Wives 
(Work)  0M  T  P(Work)  Th  T 
At Means  .57  1.03  —.73  .49  1.09  —.24 
Disability Indicator 
—  a  .81  .50  — .36  .63  .81  —.18 
Disability Indicator 
+  a  .30  1.72  —1.23  .35  1.41  —.32 
Expected Labor Market 
Income - a  .40  1.45  -1.03  .31  1.53  -.34 
Expected Labor Market 
Income +  .73  .67  -.48  .67  .71  -.16 27 
T&ble  5 
Simulated Effects of Changes  in Expected Transfer 
Incomes and Expected Transfer Income  Changes 
on  the Work  Effort Choice 
Percent of 
Predicted T 
Change of T 







Heads  Wives 
1.  lOOM;  lOOT;  lOOLM;  lOOL\T  .551  .496 
2.  lOOM;  120T;  1OOM; lOOtT  .488  .478 
3.  lOOM;  l2OT;  lOOEM;  12OAT  .483  .470 
4.  lOOM;  80T;  100AM;  IOOAT  .609  .514 
5.  lOOM;  80T;  100AM;  80ST  .613  .522 28 
Appendix A 
Variable  Descriptions,  Means and Standard  Deviations 
Mean  (Standard Deviation) 
Variable  Description  Heads  Wives 
Dependent 
Work Status  Dummy  variable  equals  if I  if  .57(.5)  .49(.5) 
woman  has  labor  income 
(earnings + hours  on  strike  or 
unemployed  x wage  rate)  >  $3360 
or  is  self—employed and  worked 
>  500  hours  or  has  labor  income 
>  0  and  no  disability transfers 
Independent 
Income  Woman's  labor  earnings  and  6.9(5.0)  6.2(6.7) 
Unemployment Compensation  + 
SSD  +  SSDI  + AFDC  + other 
welfare and  transfer and help 
from relatives in 1977  in 
$l000's 
Expected  Estimated  value  of  woman's 
(I)  Nonwork  income  if  in  (1)  nonwork  (1)  3.5(1.4)  4.0(2.3) 
(T)  and  or (2)  work options in  (2)  9.4(2.8)  8.7(3.6) 
(2) Labor  $l000's 
Market  (11) 
Income 
Change in M  Percentage  change in  -6.2(13.3)  -38.9(27.3) 
and T  expected  (1)  T and (2) M  —11.9(25.2)  —68.9(57.5) 
from 1978 to 1981 
Education  and  Woman's years of education 
Education  and years of education  10.5(3.1)  11.4(2.8) 
Squared  squared 
Work  Years of full-time work 
Experience  experience  21.2(11.3)  15.1(9.5) 
Mother's  Woman's mother's  years of 
Education  education  7.3(3.2)  8.5(3.6) 
Disability  Disability  measure created 
Indicator  by a latent variable  estimation 
model  (see Appendix B)  19.9(3.0)  17.7(3.1) 
Age Dummy  Dummy variable equals  I  if 
woman is  >  60 in  1978  .19(.4)  .lO(.3) 29 
Appendix  A (continued) 
Mean (Standard Deviation) 
Variable  Description  Heads  Wives 
Husband-Wife  Difference  in years between 
Age  ages of husband and wife 
Difference  NA  3.26(5.2) 
Race  Dummy variable equals 1  if 
woman  is white  .40(.5)  .73(.4) 
Religion Dummies 
Protestant  Dummy  variables  that equal  .76(.4)  .64(.5) 
Catholic  1 if woman's reported  .l5(.4)  .2l(.4) 
Jewish  religion  is specified group  .02(.1)  .05(.2) 
Unemployment  1977 unemployment  rate in 
Rate  area  in which woman resided  3.6(.8)  3.4(.9) 
Occupation  Dummies 
Professional  Occupation  dummy variables  1  .09(.3)  .ll(.3) 
Managerial  if usual occupation is  .04(.2)  .05(.2) 
Clerical—  specified occupation.  Omitted 
Sales  group is no recorded  .l9(.4)  .34(.5) 
Operative  occupation  .l4(.3)  .l8(.4) 
Laborer- 
S  e  rvi  cc 
Worker  .52(.5)  .30(.4) 
Number  of 
Children 
before  Number  of children  the woman had 
Age 25  before  she was  25 years old  1.6(1.6)  1.4(1.3) 
Number of 
Children--  Number of children <  12 woman 
1—12  has  as of 1976  .49(.9)  .49(.9) 
Origin 
Dummies 
Farm  Dummy variables  that equal I  .35(.5)  .32(.5) 
Urban  if woman was  raised on a farm  .30(.5)  .31(.5) 
or in an-urban area 
respectively 
Region  Woman currently  resides in 
(South —1)  Southern  part of  country  .42(.5)  .35(.5) 30 
Appendix A (continued) 
Mean  (Standard Deviation) 
Variable  Description  Heads  Wives 
Marital Status Dummies 
Divorced  or  Dummy variable equals I  if  .59(.5)  NA 
Separated,  woman  Is currently divorced 
Widowed  or separated or is currently  .34(.5)  NA 
widowed 
Disabled  Woman's husband disabled as 
Spouse  of 1977  NA  .17(.3) 
Asset Income  Family  income from assets 
in$l000's  .00(.0)  .25(1.1) 
Wage Rate  Husband's  earnings capacity 
of Spouse  estimated from an OLS wage 
rate equation including 
race, unemployment, South, 
disability  status and work 
experience  NA  7.2(2.0) 31 
Appendix B 
An  Indicator  of  Disability  and  Health  Statu8 
Measured  as  an  Unobservable 
The  indicator  used  in this work is designed to be a multipurpose 
indicator of  true disability that  emphasizes the functional and work— 
related character of impairments  (a  loss  in physiological, anatomical  or 
mental capacity).  True disability  is viewed as an unobservable and its 
value is estimated as a latent  variable from a system of structural 
equations.  The structure of the model is presented in equations  1 and  2: 
(1)  U5 = B'X + 
e1 
(2)  I.  a.D* +  e.,  —]  —1  1 
where D*  is the unobservable variable  measuring true  disability status;  X 
is a vector of observable exogenous variables; 1  is  a  vector  of  indica-  1 
tors  for  the unobservable variable D*; a 
is the vector  of coefficients 
relating D*  to  each  indicator; and e,  are the vectors of error  ternis 
assumed  to  be  normally  distributed. 
The  model was estimated using  LISREL full-information, maximum like- 
lihood  procedure.  The data used were persons 18-64 in the 1978 Social 
Security Administration Survey of the Disabled.  The model and results 
are described more fully in haveman and Wolfe (1985). 
The X vector includes the socioeconomic characteristics of the  indi- 
vidual,  family income,  personal habits,  and  the requirements and  charac- 
teristics of an individual's normal occupation.  The I Vector of 
indicators includes variables which are  expected to reflect the presence 
or absence of impairing conditions or functional limitations.  They 32 
include the extent of self-reported  and interviewer-reported  work limita- 
tions, medicalcare  utilization, specific health problems, general 
health, mobility, and the percentage of weighted occupations  for which a 
person is qualified based on a comparison  of job  requirements with indi- 
vidual capabilities. 
The results are used to calculate an imputed value of D* for each 
observa  tion. 33 
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